Adrian Lowery, a longshoreman, was injured aboard a vessel owned by Avenue 8 Holding Ltd. and Giulia Shipping Ltd. He sued the shipping companies alleging the ship’s crew failed to warn him about a dangerous condition, a worn latch on a rail near a hatch he was using.
Before the case went to trial, both sides fought over whose expert witnesses would be allowed to testify.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the landmark Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals(1993), federal judges act as “gatekeepers”. They decide whether an expert is qualified and whether their opinions rest on a reliable foundation. Importantly, courts favor letting experts testify and testing weak opinions through cross-examination, rather than excluding them outright. Exclusion is the exception, not the rule.
Sweeney, a maritime officer with 20 years of vessel experience and work as a safety auditor since 2009, was offered to testify about longshoring industry customs and standards. The defense tried to knock her out, arguing her experience was outdated, she’d never worked on foreign-flagged ships, and she had limited stevedore background.
The court wasn’t persuaded. The defense never explained why those gaps actually mattered here. However, two of Sweeney’s opinions crossed a line: she opined that “crew should recognize” the risk to workers and “should foresee” that an experienced worker like Lowery couldn’t detect the danger. That’s human factors testimony which requires specialized expertise Sweeney doesn’t have. Those two opinions were excluded. Her remaining opinions about industry standards stood.
Gilliam brought 35 years in the longshore industry, including 20 years as a “walking boss” (a supervisory role) and a stint as union president. He opined that the rail in question was commonly used by both crew and longshoremen, contrary to what the ship’s Chief Mate Singh claimed.
The defense argued Gilliam wasn’t qualified and that his opinion was just “that’s how it’s done” without any formal methodology. The court disagreed. However, Gilliam did write in his report that a worn latch created a “hidden defect.” Plaintiff’s own lawyers conceded at the hearing that Gilliam isn’t a defect expert and wasn’t offered as one. That portion of his testimony was excluded. Everything about industry customs and practices stayed in.
Faherty, a marine engineer with five years as a chief engineer and 30 years as a maritime consultant, was offered by the defense to counter Lowery’s account. Plaintiff argued he lacked foundation and his opinions weren’t helpful to a jury.
The court disagreed on both counts. Faherty’s experience grounds his opinions, and explaining things like vessel log requirements and proper use of safety fencing is genuinely useful to jurors who don’t know the maritime industry. He may also highlight inconsistencies between Lowery’s account and industry standards.
The court denied all three exclusion motions in part and granted them in part:
- Sweeney: Qualified and mostly admissible; her two “human factors” opinions excluded.
- Gilliam: Qualified and mostly admissible; his opinion on the existence of a defect excluded.
- Faherty: Fully admissible; motion to exclude denied (without prejudice to raise issues at trial).
The Takeaway
This case is a clear illustration of how courts draw the line between what an expert can say and what they cannot. Experience in an industry qualifies someone to describe how that industry operates, but it doesn’t automatically qualify them to opine on human psychology, product defects, or what a reasonable person would have noticed. Experts who stray outside their lane risk having those opinions cut.
For anyone involved in litigation: the battle over expert witnesses often shapes the entire trial. Getting the right expert, one whose background precisely matches the opinions being offered, is just as important as the facts of the case itself.
This post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.