Dunlap Towing Co. v. United States, No. C26-1431-KKE (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2026)

Even the federal government has to follow the fine print in admiralty practice. In a short but instructive order, a federal judge in Seattle refused to issue arrest warrants for three tugboats because the government’s papers didn’t actually describe the boats.

Dunlap Towing Company sued the United States. The government answered and filed a counterclaim alleging that three of Dunlap’s tugs, the GENE DUNLAP, the HERCULES, and the POLAR STORM, caused damage to a vessel called the Beluga.

The government asked the court to order the arrest of all three tugs.

Vessel arrests are governed by Supplemental Rule C of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To arrest a vessel, the claimant must file a verified complaint (or here, a verified counterclaim) that:

  1. States an in rem cause of action — typically enforcement of a maritime lien;
  2. Describes the vessel “with reasonable particularity”; and
  3. States that the vessel is within the district, or will be while the action is pending.

If those conditions appear to be met, the court has no discretion and it must direct the clerk to issue the arrest warrant. But every element has to be there.

The government checked nearly every box. It pleaded an in rem claim based on damage the tugs allegedly caused, verified the counterclaim, and alleged the vessels were in the Western District of Washington.

It stumbled on the description. The counterclaim identified each tug by name and official number and nothing else. No length, no vessel type, no build year, no physical characteristics. The court surveyed the case law and found that a name and O.N. alone do not cut it. Other courts in the district have denied arrest warrants on identical grounds. By contrast, courts have found “reasonable particularity” satisfied by descriptions as simple as “a 2003 Farr 40 sailboat of approximately 40.5-feet in length, and 13-feet in beam,” or “a 38-foot Bertram motor yacht.”

The line the cases draw is practical: the marshal executing the warrant, and the world at large, should be able to identify the specific vessel from the pleading itself. A registry number in a database doesn’t do that. A short physical description does.

All three arrest applications were denied without prejudice meaning the government can fix its pleadings and refile.

Takeaways

Vessel arrest is a checklist procedure. Rule C is mechanical: satisfy every element and the warrant issues automatically; miss one and it doesn’t, no matter who you are. The United States government lost this round on a pleading detail.

Describe the boat. This is the easiest defect in admiralty practice to avoid. Two sentences stating the vessel type, length, beam, year, builder would have carried the government across the line.

If you need to enforce a maritime lien, or your vessel is facing seizure, contact the Law Office of Alexander T Gruft.

Wesco Sales Corp. v. M/Y Tail Magnet, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106179 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2026)

Wesco Sales Corporation owns and operates Dana Landing, a marina in San Diego. The defendant is the M/Y Tail Magnet, a 1986, 40-foot sportfisher motor yacht. In March 2020, the boat’s owners, Amanda Ragsdale and John Rost, signed an “Agreement of Private Wharfage” with Wesco, paying for a slip at Dana Landing where the yacht would be kept. Over time, the owners stopped paying. By March 1, 2026 the unpaid balance had reached $20,866.10. Wesco sued the vessel to recover its fees.

Wesco asked the court to issue a Warrant for Arrest of the vessel. Once arrested, the vessel can be held, and ultimately sold, to satisfy the unpaid debt. Wesco also asked the court to appoint Wesco as Substitute Custodian meaning it would continue to maintain and watch over the vessel while the lawsuit proceeds.

On the arrest warrant, the court applied a straightforward rule: to arrest a vessel, a plaintiff must file a verified complaint (a sworn statement) that (1) describes the vessel with reasonable specificity, and (2) confirms the vessel is located within the court’s jurisdiction. Wesco’s complaint checked both boxes. It described the Tail Magnet in detail (make, model, year, Coast Guard registration number, dimensions) and confirmed it was docked in San Diego. Based on those facts, the court found Wesco had established a prima facie case (a legally sufficient initial showing) that it held a valid maritime lien, and it authorized the arrest.

On the substitute custodian request, the court applied Local Civil Rule E.1, which allows a judge to hand custody of an arrested vessel to a marina or similar if that facility can safely keep the vessel and has adequate insurance. Wesco submitted a declaration from its Director of Operations, Ryan Clark, who confirmed:

  • The Tail Magnet was already docked at Dana Landing, behind a security gate.
  • Neighboring live-aboard boaters had agreed to watch the vessel after hours.
  • Wesco would photograph the boat, perform ongoing inspections and cleaning, and maintain full custodial services.
  • Wesco carried a $1 million Commercial Marine Liability policy and a $4 million Marine Excess Liability policy.

The court found this more than sufficient and appointed Wesco as substitute custodian.

No one appeared in court on behalf of the vessel or its owners, and no opposition was filed to either motion.

The court granted both motions. A warrant for arrest of the M/Y Tail Magnet was authorized and directed to the U.S. Marshal for service. Wesco was appointed as substitute custodian and authorized to keep the vessel at Dana Landing until further court order.

The court also made clear that the vessel’s owners retain the right to a prompt post-seizure hearing.

Key Takeaways

Docking fees are not just a financial obligation between the vessel owner and a marina. They are a maritime obligation that attaches to your vessel. If you fall behind, the marina may have the legal right to have your boat arrested by a federal marshal and ultimately sold. Unlike a car loan where a lender repossesses the vehicle, here the boat itself is the collateral, automatically, by operation of law.

Federal admiralty law gives marinas powerful tools to collect on unpaid wharfage accounts. Marinas don’t have to chase the owner in small claims court. They can file a maritime lien action in federal court, seek arrest of the vessel, and potentially serve as substitute custodian while the case proceeds. This keeps your marina in control of the situation and avoids government storage costs.

This blog post is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. If you have questions about maritime liens or admiralty law, consult a licensed maritime attorney.

When Your Custodian Wears Two Hats: A Cautionary Tale About Vessel Repairs, Broker Commissions, and the Limits of Custodia Legis – Century Bank v. M/V Summer 69 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2026)

In 2019, Marine Biology Research, LLC (MBR) borrowed $5.9 million from Century Bank and pledged two vessels as collateral: a 130-foot Westport luxury motor yacht called the Summer 69 and a 42-foot Scout center-console sportfishing boat. Both were secured by preferred ship mortgages.

MBR defaulted. In August 2023, Century Bank filed suit and had both vessels arrested by the U.S. Marshal. The bank then asked the court to appoint a company called National Liquidators, a well-known marine repossession and auction firm, as substitute custodian to care for the vessels during the litigation.

Century Bank didn’t just hire National Liquidators to watch the boats. It also hired National Liquidators as its exclusive sales broker, agreeing to pay a 6% commission on whatever the vessels fetched at auction. National Liquidators thus wore two hats from day one: court-appointed guardian of the vessels, and commissioned salesman with a financial incentive to maximize their value.

To make matters more complicated, shortly after arrest, lightning struck the Summer 69, leaving it unseaworthy with significant damage to its electrical systems, engine computers, and battery banks. MBR, the borrower, did nothing to fix it.

In May 2024, the court granted Century Bank summary judgment on the mortgages and entered a final judgment of $6,438,103.31. In August 2024, the U.S. Marshal auctioned both vessels. The yacht sold for $5.6 million and the Scout for $295,000. After the Marshal’s commission, Century Bank received $5,837,498.34, an amount well short of the judgment. The bank then returned to court seeking to add the shortfall through a series of additional claims: more storage and maintenance costs, a broker’s commission, attorney’s fees, and additional interest bringing its total ask to over $2.25 million in further recovery.

The magistrate judge held a multi-day evidentiary hearing with nearly 100 exhibits and multiple expert witnesses, then issued a detailed report recommending the bank recover approximately $1.97 million. The magistrate judge granted some claims in full, trimmed others significantly, and rejected others outright.

1. Custodia Legis — The Court’s Power Over Custodial Expenses

Under federal admiralty law, when a vessel is arrested and placed under court supervision, the expenses of caring for that vessel are treated as “expenses of justice” and are paid out of the sale proceeds ahead of all other liens, including preferred ship mortgages. The idea is that someone has to pay to keep the boat from sinking while the lawyers argue.

But there are important limits. Southern District of Florida Local Admiralty Rules require that a substitute custodian’s job is to maintain an arrested vessel in its existing condition, not to improve it. And critically, any non-emergency repairs require prior court approval. A custodian who makes improvements without permission risks losing priority or losing the expense claim entirely.

National Liquidators largely ignored these rules. Its emails, introduced at the hearing, showed the firm wasn’t preserving the vessels. Rather it was preparing them for retail sale. Emails referenced “making a prep list to get ready for sale,” “readying the boat for sale,” and arranging sea trials for prospective buyers. The firm replaced control consoles, navigation displays, and four large batteries; cleaned and video-documented the hull; and undertook other significant work all without ever asking the court for permission.

The magistrate judge found these expenses ineligible as custodia legis. The costs were improvements for sale, not preservation of the arrested condition. The court excluded $113,388.18 in non-emergency repair costs from custodial expense treatment.

The court also rejected National Liquidators’ $15,729 in storage fees for the Scout, finding they were 100% profit. The marina charged nothing extra for the Scout’s berth alongside the yacht, and National Liquidators simply invoiced the bank for fees it never paid. Similarly, the court rejected $63,000 in insurance charges because National Liquidators’ representative couldn’t explain at the hearing how the charges were calculated or even what the bank actually paid in premiums.

The legitimate custodia legis expenses, daily custodial fees, actual moorage, routine maintenance, and the custodian’s reasonable 15% contractor markup, were allowed, totaling $178,511.74.

2. The Preferred Ship Mortgage as a Safety Net

Even though the court rejected many of the expenses under the custodia legisdoctrine, it found a separate basis to award them anyway: the language of the preferred ship mortgages themselves.

Both mortgages contained “Additional Advances” provisions, under which MBR agreed that Century Bank could, in its sole discretion, repair the vessels, maintain insurance, and cover storage costs if MBR failed to do so, and that all such advances would be secured by the mortgage lien. The mortgages also contained a broad indemnification clause, requiring MBR to reimburse Century Bank for any expenses arising from the exercise of its rights under the mortgages.

The vessels argued these provisions only applied to non-judicial repossession scenarios, not judicial foreclosure. The court disagreed, pointing to an express “election of remedies” clause allowing the bank to pursue all available remedies simultaneously.

The upshot: even though the non-emergency repairs, Scout storage fees, insurance charges, and the broker’s 6% commission ($353,700) were disqualified as custodia legis expenses, they were all added back into the judgment as mortgage-secured Additional Advances or indemnification obligations. The vessels’ owners (MBR) had contractually agreed to pay for all of it.

3. Attorney’s Fees — Close But Not Quite

The bank sought $209,278.50 in attorney’s fees, authorized by the mortgage documents. The court found the hourly rates reasonable but trimmed the hours by 15% across the board, noting that the vessels had offered essentially no opposition to the lawsuit. They did not contest the arrest or oppose summary judgment, and told the court they were holding back specifically to limit the bank’s fee exposure. The billing records also showed charges for purely administrative tasks and duplicative work by multiple attorneys. The court awarded $177,886.73.

4. Interest — Two Different Rates for Two Different Periods

The promissory notes called for a 21% default interest rate. Century Bank wanted that rate to continue running on the full judgment balance indefinitely. The court said no.

Under federal law (28 U.S.C. § 1961), once a court enters a final judgment, post-judgment interest accrues at the statutory Treasury rate, not the contractual default rate, unless the contract clearly and unambiguously specifies otherwise. The promissory notes here provided for 21% interest upon default, but said nothing about post-judgment interest. That silence was fatal to the bank’s argument.

The court therefore applied three distinct interest periods: the contractual 21% rate from the prior calculation date through the date of judgment; the statutory rate of 5.19% from judgment through the vessel sale; and then a sharply reduced per diem thereafter, recalculated on the remaining deficiency balance after sale proceeds were applied.

The Conclusion

The magistrate judge recommended an Amended Final Judgment of $1,968,558.35, broken down roughly as follows: $178,511.74 in legitimate custodia legis expenses; $546,817.18 in mortgage-based Additional Advances and indemnification (repairs, storage, insurance, broker commission); $177,886.73 in attorney’s fees; $288,192.95 in prejudgment interest at 21%; and $173,189.60 in post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. The court also recommended denying the bank’s request to reserve jurisdiction for future awards. The vessels are sold and gone, and the case should close.

The Takeaway

This case is essential reading for anyone involved in preferred ship mortgage enforcement including lenders, borrowers, custodians, and their counsel alike. Several practical lessons stand out:

Get court approval before making repairs. The local admiralty rules exist for a reason. A substitute custodian who makes non-emergency repairs without prior court authority faces a real risk of losing custodia legis status and priority, and potentially losing the expense claim entirely. The fact that the bank recovered these amounts here was only because the mortgage documents provided an independent legal basis. In a case with competing lienholders, the result could have been much worse.

The “two hats” problem is a real legal risk. Appointing the same firm as both substitute custodian and sales broker creates an inherent conflict. The custodian’s job is to preserve the vessel as-is; the broker’s job is to maximize sale price through improvements. These incentives pull in opposite directions, and courts will scrutinize the resulting expenses carefully.

Draft your mortgage documents to cover enforcement costs explicitly. The reason Century Bank ultimately recovered expenses that failed under custodia legis was because its mortgage documents contained robust Additional Advances and indemnification provisions. Lenders without those provisions could face a much harder fight.

Post-judgment interest follows the statute, not the contract, unless the contract says so clearly. Lenders who want their contractual default rate to continue running after judgment need to say so explicitly in the loan documents. A general default rate provision is not enough.

Get brokerage agreements approved in advance. Several courts in this district have expressly approved sales brokerage arrangements in arrested vessel cases. There was no reason for Century Bank to forego that step. Court approval would have mooted the entire dispute over the $353,700 commission.

Marina Wins on Liability, But Court Sends It Back to Do the Math — Harbour Towne SMI Opco, LLC v. M/Y “Lady Cher L C’s” (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2026)

In January 2015, a Fort Lauderdale-area marina called Harbour Towne entered into a dockage contract with James Muskal, the owner of a 2005 55-foot motor yacht called the Lady Cher L C’s. For nearly a decade, the arrangement apparently worked. The owner paid and the marina provided dockage, electricity, and other services. In May 2024, the payments stopped.

By the time Harbour Towne filed suit in federal court, it claimed $61,059.06 in unpaid dockage and marina services. The marina had the vessel arrested by the U.S. Marshal in May 2025 and served as the court-appointed substitute custodian racking up an additional $101,571.64 in court-supervised storage costs through January 2026.

RBC Centura held a First Preferred Ship Mortgage on the vessel totaling over $358,000. RBC showed up in the case to protect its mortgage interest and argued that its mortgage outranked Harbour Towne’s lien. The vessel owner himself never appeared in court at all, and a default was entered against the vessel.

The case presented two main issues:

1. Did the marina have a valid maritime lien?

Under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act (CIMLA), 46 U.S.C. § 31342 anyone who provides “necessaries” to a vessel at the direction of the owner automatically acquires a maritime lien on that vessel. “Necessaries” is broadly defined and includes dockage, storage, electricity, repairs, and supplies, i.e. anything the vessel needs to keep operating. The lien attaches to the vessel itself, not just the owner personally, which is what makes it so powerful: you can sue the boat.

2. How much could the marina actually recover?

This turned out to be the more complicated question, and the one where the marina ran into trouble.

The court ruled in Harbour Towne’s favor. The marina provided dockage and other services under a signed contract with the vessel’s owner, the owner paid without complaint for nine years, and then stopped. That’s a textbook maritime lien for necessaries.

On damages, the court pumped the brakes. Several of Harbour Towne’s claimed charges didn’t hold up to scrutiny:

The $50 monthly late fee billed to the owner was not recoverable because it isn’t a “necessary” provided to the vessel; it’s a penalty for nonpayment.

The original 2015 contract called for a daily fee of $99.11. The invoices submitted with the motion reflected daily rates of $147 to $156 which was significantly higher. The court acknowledged rates may have legitimately increased over a decade, but the marina provided no explanation or documentation for the discrepancy. Without that, the higher rates couldn’t be awarded.

The marina’s invoices included line items of $3,620 for “Attorney Fees” and $4,000 for “Attorney/US Marshal Fee.” The court rejected both. Attorney’s fees are not necessaries under maritime law, and the U.S. Marshal deposit is only recoverable to the extent the marshal actually spent the money and not as a flat reimbursement of whatever was deposited.

The marina’s $101,571.64 in post-arrest storage and maintenance costs were legally recoverable, and they take priority over other claims, but the court ruled the request was premature because the vessel hadn’t been sold yet. Harbour Towne can file for those costs after the sale.

The marina is entitled to interest on the unpaid balance running from May 1, 2024 (when payments first went delinquent) through the date of the vessel’s sale.

The court entered judgment on liability but ordered Harbour Towne to file a corrected damages submission by May 29, 2026, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal.

This case is a useful reminder that winning on liability is only half the battle in a maritime lien enforcement action. The damages phase has its own pitfalls, and courts scrutinize maritime lien invoices carefully.

Several practical lessons emerge. Don’t bundle attorney’s fees or penalty charges into your lien invoices because they won’t be recoverable and can undermine your credibility on the amounts that are legitimate. If your rates have increased since the original contract was signed, document the basis for those increases. A simple rate-update amendment or notice to the vessel owner goes a long way.

Courts will only award what the Marshal actually spent. If you deposited $3,500 or $4,000 and the Marshal didn’t spend all of it, you need to show actual disbursements.

Custodia legis costs are legitimate and priority-ranked, but they’re awarded from sale proceeds and not as part of a pre-sale damages judgment. Time your motion accordingly.

The priority dispute between Harbour Towne’s maritime lien and RBC’s preferred ship mortgage wasn’t resolved in this opinion. That fight will happen after the vessel is sold and the proceeds are distributed. In general, maritime liens for necessaries that predate a preferred ship mortgage take priority over the mortgage. Whether that applies here will depend on when Harbour Towne’s lien first attached which is a question likely to generate further litigation.

The Law Office of Alexander T Gruft handles maritime lien enforcement, marina disputes, and admiralty litigation. Contact us to discuss your matter.

Court Orders Sale of Arrested Nigerian Barge After Owner Fails to Act — A Cautionary Tale for Vessel Owners – Int’l Ship Repair & Marine Services, Inc. v. Formerly B (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2026)

In 2024, a Nigerian shipping company called Herald Marine & Energy arranged to berth its aging deck cargo barge at International Ship Repair and Marine Services (ISR), a Tampa-area ship repair facility. Herald Marine would pay dockage fees while it organized a crew to sail the vessel back to Nigeria. The crew never came. The fees went unpaid.

In June 2025, ISR filed a federal maritime lawsuit and had the U.S. Marshal arrest the vessel under court supervision with ISR serving as its custodian. From the date of arrest through March 2026, the barge racked up over $832,000 in court-supervised storage costs, on top of the nearly $841,000 Herald Marine already owed, bringing the total claim to more than $1.67 million. This amount grew at $2,544 per day. Herald Marine, for its part, claimed ISR promised to make certain repairs before the vessel could be moved, but took no meaningful steps to bond the vessel out of arrest or otherwise resolve the situation.

ISR asked the court for an interlocutory sale so it could stop the financial bleeding.

Under the Federal Rules governing admiralty cases (Supplemental Rule E(9)(a)), a court can authorize an early sale of an arrested vessel if any one of three conditions is met: (1) the vessel is deteriorating or perishable; (2) the cost of keeping it is excessive or disproportionate to its value; or (3) there has been an unreasonable delay by the owner in securing its release.

ISR argued two of the three applied here.

The magistrate judge agreed with ISR on both grounds.

On the cost vs. value question, the court noted that the barge was old, and before Herald Marine came along, the only parties who had expressed any interest in buying it were scrap dealers. Spending $2,544 per day to store a vessel of that diminished worth is exactly the kind of “disproportionate” expense the rule is designed to address.

On unreasonable delay, the court observed that courts typically view four to five months post-arrest as the threshold for ordering a sale. Here, over ten months had passed with no resolution. Herald Marine’s vague gestures toward settlement and its unresolved repair dispute did not move the needle.

The court recommended that the U.S. Marshal conduct a public auction within 30 days, with proper notice to the owner, known lienholders, and the public. Sale proceeds would go into the court’s registry, and all claimants, including Herald Marine, would have the chance to argue their priority and entitlement to whatever the vessel fetches.

This case is a stark reminder that inaction is never a safe harbor when your vessel is under maritime arrest. Once a federal court seizes a vessel, the clock starts running on storage costs, on the owner’s window to post a bond or negotiate a release, and on the court’s patience. Four to five months is roughly the outer limit before a court will entertain selling the vessel out from under the owner, regardless of fault disputes. Here, Herald Marine’s delay cost it any meaningful control over the outcome. The vessel will now be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, potentially for scrap value, with ISR’s mounting liens paid first from the proceeds.

For vessel owners and operators: if your vessel is arrested, act immediately. Engage counsel, explore bonding the vessel out of arrest, and engage seriously with the claimant. Delay is expensive, and in admiralty, it can be fatal to your ownership interest.

The Law Office of Alexander T Gruft handles maritime lien enforcement, marina disputes, and admiralty litigation. Contact us to discuss your matter.

Boat Yard Bills Top $340,000 — And the Owner Just Disappeared – Taylor Lane Yacht & Ship, LLC v. M/Y Gambit (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2026)

What Happened

Taylor Lane Yacht and Ship, a Fort Lauderdale-area boatyard and marina, provided dockage, storage, and other services to a 55-foot Sea Ray motor yacht called the Gambit, registered in the British Virgin Islands. The vessel’s owner of record was a company called Dos Rios Enterprises, and a man named Fernando Carmona had authority to arrange services on the vessel’s behalf.

For a while, the arrangement worked fine. The owners paid several invoices without complaint, establishing a normal course of dealing with the boatyard. Then, starting in April 2024, the payments stopped. By the time Taylor Lane filed suit in late 2025, the unpaid tab had grown to nearly $343,000 in services alone, covering more than a year and a half of dockage and related work.

The owners were properly served. However, they did nothing in response to the lawsuit. The vessel was arrested by the U.S. Marshal in January 2026, and Taylor Lane was appointed as substitute custodian, continuing to rack up custodial fees at $512 per day while the case proceeded.

The Legal Issues

The case raised three distinct claims, each worth understanding separately.

Maritime lien on the vessel. Under the federal Maritime Lien Act (46 U.S.C. § 31342), anyone who provides “necessaries” to a vessel, broadly defined to include dockage, storage, repairs, and supplies, automatically acquires a lien on the vessel itself from the moment the debt arises. The lien attaches to the boat, not just the owner personally, which is what makes it such a powerful remedy. Taylor Lane provided necessaries, on the authority of the owners, at rates the owners had previously accepted without objection. All the elements were met.

Breach of contract against the owners personally. In addition to the in rem lien claim against the vessel, Taylor Lane also sued the owners directly, in personam, for breach of the dockage and project management agreements. This is an important strategic point: maritime lien enforcement only gets you what the boat is worth at auction. If the lien claim doesn’t fully satisfy the debt, a parallel personal judgment against the owners gives the plaintiff another avenue to collect.

Custodia legis expenses. Once a vessel is under court-ordered arrest and a substitute custodian is appointed to maintain it, the custodian’s ongoing fees take on a special status. The fees are called custodia legis expenses, meaning costs incurred in the custody of the law. These get administrative priority, meaning they’re paid before other claims from the sale proceeds.

What the Court Decided

With no opposition from anyone, the court granted Taylor Lane everything it asked for on the merits:

  • A judgment of $342,974.59 on the maritime lien, with an order to sell the vessel at public auction.
  • The same amount as a personal judgment against both the individual owner and the corporate entity for breach of contract.
  • Ongoing custodia legis fees at $512 per day from January 28, 2026 through the date the sale is confirmed.
  • Prejudgment interest at the federal statutory rate.
  • Authorization to credit bid the full judgment amount at the Marshal’s sale.
  • The right to pursue attorneys’ fees separately in personam because the contracts expressly provided for fee recovery.

Two Details Worth Noting

First, the attorneys’ fees issue cuts the other way from Southport Marina. There, the marina got nothing on fees because its storage contract was silent on the subject and admiralty’s default rule bars fee-shifting. Further, the plaintiff in Southport Marina only named the vessel as a defendant and did not assert in personam claims. Here, Taylor Lane’s contracts had fee provisions and the individual owners were named defendants, so the court left the door open. The lesson is the same from both sides: the contract language matters enormously.

Second, the court awarded both an in rem judgment against the vessel and an in personam judgment against the owners for the same underlying debt. These aren’t double recovery. If the auction proceeds cover the full amount, that’s the end of it. But if the vessel sells short, Taylor Lane can pursue the owners’ other assets for the deficiency. Running both claims in parallel is standard practice in maritime lien enforcement and worth understanding if you’re on either side of a marina services dispute.

Takeaway for Marina and Boatyard Operators

This case illustrates the full toolkit available when a vessel owner goes dark on a large unpaid balance. The maritime lien is the foundation and attaches automatically, travels with the vessel, and can be enforced by arresting and selling the boat regardless of who owns it or where it’s flagged. But layering in a personal breach of contract claim against the owner and any controlling individual is essential, especially on large accounts, because vessel auction proceeds are unpredictable.

Two practical points:

First, include attorneys’ fee provisions in your service agreements. The difference between recovering legal costs and absorbing them yourself often comes down to a single contract clause.

Second, don’t wait too long to act. The $343,000 balance here accumulated over roughly 20 months of unpaid services. Earlier intervention, even just a demand letter or an informal lien notice, might have prompted payment or at least reduced the exposure. Maritime liens don’t expire quickly, but ongoing storage costs eat into any eventual auction recovery, and a boat sitting in your yard for two years is a yard space problem as much as a legal one.


This post is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Contact a maritime attorney for guidance on your specific situation.

When Your Boat Is in New Jersey, So Is Your Legal Problem Pen Air Credit Union v. Fan-Dane-Go 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96682 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2026)

In June 2023, Shawn Steele borrowed $299,243 from Pen Air Credit Union to buy a 34-foot Cape Horn recreational boat called Fan-Dane-Go. The loan was secured by a First Preferred Ship Mortgage recorded with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Steele stopped making payments. By September 2024, Pen Air declared him in default and demanded the full outstanding balance of $335,375. Steele ignored the demands.

Pen Air sued in federal court in New Jersey, where the boat was sitting at Seaport Inlet Marina in Belmar. The bank pursued two tracks simultaneously: an in rem claim against the boat itself (asking the court to seize and sell it) and an in personam claim against Steele personally for the breach of contract. The court issued an arrest warrant for the vessel, and it was seized in May 2025.

Steele, a Florida resident, moved to dismiss the personal claim against him arguing New Jersey had no business dragging him into court there. According to Steele, he lived in Florida, the loan was made in Florida, and he never purposefully did anything in New Jersey related to the loan.

The court addressed the question of whether a New Jersey federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state boat owner just because his vessel happened to be docked in New Jersey.

Personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state so that being sued there doesn’t offend basic fairness. In admiralty cases, the analysis looks at whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the state. In other words, did the defendant chose to engage with it in a way that made being sued there a foreseeable consequence.

The court said yes to jurisdiction on two independent grounds.

First, under admiralty principles, the mere presence of a defendant’s vessel in the state is enough to establish minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction over the owner. A New Jersey court reached the same conclusion in a nearly identical case in 2001, and this court found that reasoning persuasive and applied it here.

Second, even setting that principle aside, Steele himself chose to store the boat in New Jersey, at a New Jersey marina, under a storage agreement, during the same period he was in default. That voluntary choice to dock the boat in New Jersey while failing to pay on the loan made it entirely foreseeable that litigation would follow him there. The court put it plainly: Steele knew the consequences of default would land in New Jersey, so he should have expected to answer for it there.

On the fairness side, the court noted that keeping the personal claim in New Jersey alongside the vessel arrest proceeding made practical sense. New Jersey also has a real interest in overseeing a commercial dispute involving a boat stored within its borders under contract with a local marina.

Steele’s motion to dismiss was denied. Steele has to defend himself in New Jersey.

The Takeaway

If you own a documented vessel secured by a ship mortgage and you default on the loan, wherever your boat is sitting is likely where you’ll be sued regardless of where you live or where the loan was signed. Borrowers should understand that mooring their vessel in another state doesn’t insulate them from jurisdiction there. Lenders, meanwhile, can take some comfort knowing that vessel location gives them meaningful leverage in choosing a favorable forum.

This post is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Contact a maritime attorney for guidance on your specific situation.

Secured By miniOrange